CV

E. Glen Weyl

(doc version pdf version)

http://www.glenweyl.com

E-mail: weyl@uchicago.edu

Cell phone: +1 (617) 599-8919

Department of Economics
University of Chicago
1126 E. 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
+1 (773) 702-4862

Fax: +1 (773) 702-8490
Office 205B

Born: May 6, 1985
Citizenship: USA
Marital status: married to Alisha C. Holland

Education at Princeton University

A.B. in Economics (2007), Valedictorian; certificates in Finance and Applications of Computing; senior thesis: "The Price Theory of Two-Sided Markets"

M.A., Ph.D. in Economics (2008), dissertation: "Essays in Industrial Organization and Economic Methodology"

Primary Employment

Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics and in the College, University of Chicago (2011-present)

Junior Fellow at the Society of Fellows, Harvard University (2008-2011)

Other Positions

Member, Chicago Center for Jewish Studies, University of Chicago (2011-present)

Affiliate, Center for Latin American Studies, University of Chicago (2011-present)

Fellow, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) (2008-present)

Visiting Advisor, Ministerio de Hacienda, Superintendecia de Industria y Comercio, and Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, Bogotá, Colombia (2011)

Visiting Assitant Professor, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia (2011)

Visiting Advisor, INDECOPI in Lima, Perú (2011)

Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of Economics, Harvard University (2008-2011)

Visiting Fellow, Milton Friedman Institute for Research in Economics (2010)

Visitor, Centro de Investigación Económica, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (CIE-ITAM) (2009)

Visiting Scholar, Instituto Nacional de Matemática Pura e Aplicada (IMPA) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (2007, 2008)

Visiting Advisor, Ministerio de la Hacienda, Santiago de Chile (2008)

Visiting Graduate, Becker Center on Chicago Price Theory at the University of Chicago (2008)

Price Theory Scholar, Becker Center on Chicago Price Theory at the University of Chicago (2007)

Summer economic analysis clerk at the Economic Analysis Group of the Department of Justice Division of Antitrust (2006)

Quantitative analyst at New York City hedge fund Blue Mountain Capital Management. Used statistical financial modeling to design an arbitrage strategy (2005)

Econometric research assistant to Stanford economic history professor Stephen Haber (2004)

Full-length Article in Economics Journal

"A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms," American Economic Review, 2010, 100(4): 1642-1672.

Short Article and Note in Economics Journals

"Holdout in the Assembly of Complements: A Problem for Market Design" with Scott Duke Kominers, forthcoming in the American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 2012.

"Linear Demand Systems are Inconsistent with Discrete Choice," with Sonia Jaffe, B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances), 2010, 10(1): article 52.

"Monopoly, Ramsey and Lindahl in Rochet and Tirole (2003)," Economics Letters, 2009, 103(2), 99-100.

Other Peer-Reviewed Publications

"Concordance among Holdouts" with Scott Duke Kominers, extended abstract forthcoming in Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC '11) .

"Economic Contract Theory Tests Models of Mutualism" with Megan E. Frederickson, Doug W. Yu and Naomi E. Pierce, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2010, 107(36): 15712-15716. Featured on the cover and reviewed as "must read" by the Faculty of 1000.

"Whose Rights? A Critique of Individual Agency as the Basis of Rights," Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2009, 8(2), 139-171.

Book

Jewish Economies: Development and Migration in American and Beyond: a two volume collection of Simon Kuznets's unpublished work on the economic history of the Jews, edited jointly with Stephanie Lo, with introductory original research chapter "Simon Kuznets: Cautious Empiricist of the Eastern European Jewish Diaspora". First volume, The Economic Life of American Jewry, was released by Transaction Publishers in November 2011; second volume, Comparative Perspectives on Jewish Migration, is forthcoming in January 2012.

Paper Under Requested Revision

"A Restatement of the Theory of Monopoly" with Michal Fabinger, under revision at the request of the Journal of Political Economy as of January 2012.

"Walrasian Equilibrium without Gross Substitutes" with Eduardo Azevedo and Alexander White, under revision at the request of Theoretical Economics as of November 2011.

"Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay" with Jean Tirole, under revision at the request of the Quarterly Journal of Economics as of September 2011.

Unpublished (Working) Papers

"The First-Order Approach to Merger Analysis" with Sonia Jaffe, Harvard University, December 2011.

"Multidimensional Heterogeneity and Platform Design" with André Veiga, September 2011.

"Insulated Platform Competition" with Alexander White, July 2011.

"Concordance among Holdouts" with Scott Duke Kominers, July 2011.

"Slutsky meets Marschak: First-Order Identification of Multi-product Production," Harvard University, December 2009.

"Pass-Through as an Economic Tool" with Michal Fabinger, Harvard University. First version: July 2008, current version October 2009.

"Psychic Income, Taxes and the Allocation of Talent," Princeton University, December 2007. Under revision with Charlie Nathanson, Harvard University.

"Is Arbitrage Socially Beneficial?" Princeton University, October 2007.

"A Simple Theory of Scientific Learning," Princeton University, September 2007.

"Biasing Auctions," Princeton University, April 2006.

Software

"Materialistic Genius Simulation Code" with Vladimir Mukharlyamov and David Smalling, Harvard University, July 2010.

"Holdout Software" with William Weingarten and Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University, April 2010.

"Apt Demand Toolkit" with Yali Miao, Harvard University, April 2009.

Work in Progress

"A Global Implicit Function Theorem" with Ioan Bejenaru and André Veiga, University of Chicago. (Coming soon)

We provide conditions under which a (unique) implicit solution to a system of equations exists, allowing that the variables may eventually have only a small impact on the equations.

"Functional Forms and the Theory of Demand" with Michal Fabinger, Harvard University and University of Chicago.

Virtually all demand systems used in empirical and theoretical applications of imperfect competition are severely restrictive on one of the most important determinants of results: the pass-through rate. We propose functional forms that overcome this problem.

"A Multi-Dimensional Envelope Theorem with Endogenous Choice Sets" with Michal Fabinger, Harvard University and University of Chicago.

We extend Milgrom and Segal (2002)'s general envelope theorem to multiple dimensions and parameter-dependent choice sets. In these environments maximization under free disposal indifference manifolds, except on a set of measure zero. Our approach provides a general foundation (necessary and sufficient conditions) for the isotransfer approach to multidimensional screening problems.

"The Correspondence Principle and the Law of Demand," University of Chicago.

The law of demand is perhaps the most fundamental principle of economics, yet conventional wisdom in game and general equilibrium theory suggests it holds in equilibrium only under stringent conditions. We show, to the contrary, that Samuelson (1941)'s local correspondence principle, that stability conditions sign basic comparative statics, holds extremely generally (N-player games, non-differentiable payoffs) so long as a reasonable notion of stability is considered. We also establish a global correspondence principle: the global version of the appropriate stability condition is equivalent to a strong form of equilibrium uniqueness. Systems governed by the dynamic our notion of stability suggests obey the law of demand.

"Quadratic Vote Buying," University of Chicago.

A community with quasi-linear utility needs to make a binary collective decision. I propose a mechanisms where votes are sold for a price quadratic in the number of votes bought, the alternative with most vote wins and all revenues generated are refunded to community members other than that which contributed them. With a large, private values community this robustly approximates the expected externality mechanism and thus efficiency, but, unlike the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism has a balanced budget and collusion-proof, and unlike the expected externality mechanism is practical. I am working to extend the analysis to richer environments: arbitrary numbers of alternatives, common values components and dynamic, non-trasferable utility settings.

"Good and Bad Market Power" with Jean Tirole, TSE and University of Chicago.

Conventional wisdom on industrial policy is that unilateral market power should be protected through intellectual property, even at the cost of deadweight loss, while multilateral market power harming consumer surplus should be counteracted by competition authorities, even if it increases social welfare. We propose a resolution to this apparent contradiction based on firms' private information about the substitutability of their products: the more substitutable products are the less value they add, but the more valuable is coordination to them. Thus the two sides of conventional industrial policy actually complement one another in screening for the most valuable innovations. The degree of optimal asymmetry in the treatment of the two types of market power depends on the degree of asymmetric information about the substitutability of products.

Opinion and Policy Articles

"Financial Guidance from FDA," Boston Globe, December 3^rd, 2008.

"Put the Bankers Back to Work," Huffington Post, February 5^th, 2009.

"Price Theory and Merger Guidelines" with Sonia Jaffe, 2011, CPI Antitrust Chronicle 3(1): article 2.

"Retos para un Mercado de Libre Competencia: El Control de Fusiones y Carteles," distributed by the Instituto de Consumo de la Universidad San Martín de Porres, delivered in July 2011.

Honors

NET Institute Grant (2010, joint with Alexander White, and 2011, joint with Andre Veiga)

Research gift from Microsoft Corporation (2010)

Sloan Foundation Research Grant, joint with Charlie Nathanson (2010)

American Economic Review Excellence in Refereeing Award (2010)

Harvard Real Estate Academic Initiative Faculty Research Grant, joint with Scott Duke Kominers (2010)

Milton Fund research grant, Harvard University (2009)

J. Wallace Ely '32 Fund, Princeton University (2008)

Supplemental Merit Fellowship, Princeton University Department of Economics (2007-2008)

Princeton University Graduate School Fellowship (2007-2008)

Elected Valedictorian by a vote of the Princeton faculty (2007)

Halbert White '72 Prize to the most outstanding economics major (2007)

Wolf Balleisan Memorial Prize for best economics senior thesis (2007)

Birch Family Prize, to the Finance Certificate student with the best grades in finance classes (2007)

Awarded Highest Honors (Summa Cum Laude) in economics (2007)

USA TODAY All-USA College Academic Team (2007)

George B. Wood Legacy Junior Prize for exceptional academic achievement in the junior year at Princeton University (2006)

Josephine De Karman Fellowship (2006)

Elected in the fall of senior year to Phi Beta Kappa with a dozen other students (2006)

Humane Studies Fellowship (2006)

Merit Scholarship from National Scholars Honor Society (2005)

Merit Award from the National Society of Collegiate Scholars (2005)

Twice, Shapiro Prize for Academic Excellence to top 35 students in each of the sophomore and junior classes at Princeton (2004, 2005)

Quin Morton '36 Writing Seminar Essay Prize to the top 10 essays by freshmen at Princeton (2004)

Walter E. Hope Prize and Spencer Trask Medal to best freshman debater at Princeton (2004)

The Daily Princetonian Arts Writing Award (2004)

Teaching Experience

ECON 20100 Elements of Economics II (Intermediate Theory of the Firm, Turbo and Regular Sections), Fall 2011.

Four invited guest lectures in ECON 50100 Price Theory (Introductory Graduate Microeconomics) taught by Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy, Fall and Winter 2011.

Invited guest lectures: Special lecture to masters 1 and 2 students at Toulouse School of Economics and ECO321 Industrial Organization (Princeton, undergraduate, Professor Swati Bhatt) on "Pass-Through, Double Marginalization and Two-Sided Markets" and COS444 Electronic Auctions (Princeton, undergraduate, Professor Ken Steiglitz) on "Frontiers of Behavioral Auction Theory" (2008).

Teaching assistant for Professors Markus Brunnermeier and José Scheinkman in Financial Economics I (PhD asset pricing), Princeton University, Fall 2006. Average course evaluation rating: 4.22/5.0.

Dissertations and Theses Asvised

André Veiga, PhD at TSE in progress, committee co-chair.

Michal Fabinger, PhD at Harvard University in progress, committee member.

William Weingarten, MA at Harvard University summa cum laude, June 2011.

Scott Duke Kominers, PhD at Harvard University, June 2011, committee member. Initial placement: post-doc at the Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics, University of Chicago.

Alexander White, PhD at TSE, June 2010, committee co-chair. Initial placement: post-doc at Harvard. Currently: Tsinghua University.