Research
Non-technical Slide Overview
Explanation of the Audio and Audio-Visual Formats
Price Theory
"Demand Forms and the Theory of Monopoly" with Michal Fabigner, in progress. (request notes)
Breaks off the last two sections of "Pass-Through as an Economic Tool", showing additionally how Apt demand extends the CES class of demand specifications typically used in aggregate models.
"Quadratic Vote Buying," in progress. (request notes)
A simple and practical mechanism approximating the expected externality mechanism for binary collective decisions.
"The Correspondence Principle and the Law of Demand," in progress. (request notes)
Weak, intuitive stability conditions alone imply the law of demand (when applied locally) and strong uniqueness (when applied globally).
"A Restatement of the Theory of Monopoly" with Michal Fabinger, under revision at the request of the Journal of Political Economy as of January 2012. (pdf) (slides)
Many properties of the monopoly problem typically seen as distinct are equivalent to one another and to the pass-through rate.
"Walrasian Equilibrium without Gross Substitutes" with Eduardo Azevedo and Alexander White, under revision at the request of Theoretical Economics as of November 2011. (pdf) (slides)
Equilibrium exists in large, quasi-linear utility economies even when consumers view goods as complements.
"Multidimensional Heterogeneity and Platform Design" with André Veiga, September 2011. (pdf) (slides)
A price theory framework for multidimensional screening generalizing a wide range of standard models.
"Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay" with Jean Tirole, Harvard University and TSE, under revision at the request of the Quarterly Journal of Economics as of September 2011. (pdf) (online appendix) (simulation code)
A multi-dimensional screening framework for trading off the sorting benefits of IP against its distorting effects on consumption ex-post
"Linear Demand Systems are Inconsistent with Discrete Choice" with Sonia Jaffe, B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances), 2010, 10(1): article 52. (published version)
We give a simple proof that the linear demand system has no discrete choice representation.
"Pass-Through as an Economic Tool" with Michal Fabinger, Harvard University. First version: July 2008, Current version: October 2009.
The pass-through rate simplifies, unifies, generalizes and extends many areas of industrial organization models.
Paper: (pdf)
Appendices: (monopoly appendix) (GCS appendix) (multiproduct appendix ) (CoPaDS appendix) (taxonomy appendix) (Apt demand appendix)
Software, joint with Yali Miao: (Apt demand toolkit lite) (Apt demand toolkit full)
Slides: (theory slides) (applied slides) (short conference slides)
Industrial Economics
"The First-Order Approach to Merger Analysis" with Sonia Jaffe, December 2011. (pdf) (slides)
We formalize, generalize, and clarify the sense in which the effect of a merger on prices and welfare is approximated by the pass-through of cannibalized profits, the foundation of the new UK and US horizontal merger guidelines.
"Insulated Platform Competition" with Alex White, Harvard University and TSE, July 2011. (SSRN) (slides) (presentation video)
A novel solution concept, insulated equilibrium, eliminates much of the equilibrium multiplicity in platform competition, giving simple general framework for applied and theoretical analysis.
"Retos para un Mercado de Libre Competencia: El Control de Fusiones y Carteles," delivered at the Insituto de Consumo de la Unviersidad San Martín, February 5th, 2008. (link)
"Price Theory and Merger Guidelines" with Sonia Jaffe, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 2011, 3(1): article 2. (pdf) (slides)
The policy implications of "The First-Order Approach to Merger Analysis".
"A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms," American Economic Review, 2010, 100(4): 1642-72. (draft) (published version) (appendix draft) (published appendix) (theoretical slides) (oriented slides) (audio)
A general theory of monopoly pricing by multi-sided platforms, emphasizing the importance of the source of user heterogeneity, with applications to regulation, measurement of market power and merger analysis.
"Double Marginalization in Two-Sided Markets," Harvard University and TSE, July 2008 (inactive). (pdf)
Vertical mergers are still beneficial in Rochet and Tirole (2003) (RT2003) two-sided markets.
"Monopoly, Ramsey and Lindahl in Rochet and Tirole (2003)," Economics Letters, 2009, 103(2), 99-100. (working draft) (published version)
The relationship between social and private pricing in RT2003.
"Biasing Auctions," Princeton University, April 2006 (inactive). (pdf) (teaching slides)
Different explanations of equilibrium winner's curse have different implications for auction design and are testable.
Interdisciplinary work
"Jewish Economies: Development and Migration in America and Beyond," two volumes of Simon Kuznets's unpublished or unavailable-in-English papers on the economic history of the Jews, edited jointly with Stephanie Lo will include an introductory, original research chapter by myself entitled "Simon Kuznets: Cautious Empiricist of the Eastern European Jewish Diaspora". The first volume of the book, "The Economic Life of American Jewry" was published in November 2011. The second volume, "Comparative Perspectives on Jewish Migration", will be published in January 2012. (Amazon) (publisher's page) (doc) (pdf) (Usury paper) (data) (slides on history of economics)
Much of Simon Kuznets's economic th inking was closely tied to his Russian Jewish heritage.
"Economic Contract Theory Tests Models of Mutualism" with Megan Frederickson, Doug W. Yu and Naomi Pierce, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2010, 107(36): 15712-6. (published version) (slides)
A general, economics-based methodology for testing theories of mutualism supports Partner Fidelity Feedback over Host Sanctions.
"Whose Rights? A Critique of Individual Agency as the Basis of Rights," Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2009, 8(2), 139-171. (draft) (published version) (working draft doc) (presentation slides)
If you think groups should not have rights because they are not agents, then you shouldn't believe in individual rights either.
"Overconfidence in Neural Networks," Princeton University, May 2006 (inactive). (request a copy)
Overconfidence arises naturally in a classical neural network model.
Finance
"Put the Bankers Back to Work," Huffington Post, February 5th, 2008. (link)
"Financial Guidance from FDA," Boston Globe, December 3rd, 2008. (published version)
"Is Arbitrage Socially Beneficial?" Princeton University, October 2007 (inactive). (pdf) (presentation slides)
Arbitrage and financial innovation are harmful when arbitrage opportunities are created by irrational investors.
"Universal Speculation," Princeton University, May 2006 (inactive). (request a copy)
The "Universal Portfolios" algorithm of Cover (1991) conflicts would not be used by a Bayesian investor.
Public Finance
"Concordance among Holdouts" with Scott Duke Kominers, extended abstract in the Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC '11), paper submitted July 2011. (published abstract) (SSRN) (appendix) (software, joint with William Weingarten) (slides) (presentation video)
A compromise on property rights that allows a reasonable degree of efficiency through simple, incentive compatible mechanisms in land assembly.
"Psychic Income, Taxes and the Allocation of Talent," Princeton University, December 2007. Revision in progress with Charlie Nathanson. (pdf) (request revision notes)
Low taxes encourage smart students to go into lucrative, socially unproductive professions, like law and finance.
Methodology
"Slutsky meets Marschak: First-Order Identification of Multi-product Production," Harvard University, December 2009 (inactive). (pdf) (appendix) (slides)
The econometric identification approach corresponding to Chetty's "sufficient statistics approach," solved for multi-product producers.
"A Simple Theory of Scientific Learning," Princeton University, September 2007 (inactive). (pdf) (short summary) (presentation slides)
A model for testing theories with precise predictions against theories with vague predictions.
Low taxes encourage smart students to go into lucrative, socially unproductive professions, like law and finance.
Mathematical Economics
"A Global Implicit Function Theorem" with Ioan Bejenaru and André Veiga, in progress.
Practical conditions under which standard economic applications of the implicit function theorem extend over the full domain.
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I am an Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics and in the College at the University of Chicago where I do research in economics and related fields, including philosophy and the history of economics.
