Research
Published Articles"Whose Rights? A Critique of Individual Agency as the Basis of Rights," Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2009, 8(2), 139-171. (draft) (published version) ( working draft doc) (presentation slides)
If you think groups should not have rights because they a re not agents, then you shouldn't believe in individual rights either.
"Monopoly, Ramsey and Lindahl in Rochet and Tirole (2003)," Economics Letters, 2009, 103(2), 99-100. (working draft) (published version) (working draft tex)
The relationship between social and private pricing in the Rochet and Tirole (2003) model. Forthcoming articles"A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms" in the American Economic Review, 100(4). (draft pdf) (appendix) (appendix tex source) (theoretical slides) (oriented slides) (audio)
A general theory of monopoly pricing by multi-sided platforms, emphasizing the importance of the source of user heterogeneity, with applications to regulation, measurement of market power and merger analysis.
"Economic Contract Theory Tests Models of Mutualism" with Megan Frederickson, Doug W. Yu and Naomi Pierce forthcoming in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, July 2010. (SSRN) (request supplements) (slides)
A general, economics-based methodology for testing theories of mutualism supports Partner Fidelity Feedback over Host Sanctions. Book under contract"Simon Kuznets: Cautious Empiricist of the Russian Jewish Diaspora," two volumes of Kuznets's unpublished or unavailable-in-English papers, edited jointly with Stephanie Lo under contract for two volumes as of May 2010 with introductory, original research chapter by myself (doc) (pdf) (Usury appendix) (table appendix) (data) (slides on history of economics). Other papers to be included will be online shortly.
Much of Simon Kuznets's economic thinking was closely tied to his Russian Jewish heritage. Paper under review"Linear Demand Systems are Inconsistent with Discrete Choice," Harvard University, February 2010. (draft pdf)
We give a simple proof that the linear demand system has no discrete choice representation.
"Concordance among Holdouts" with Scott Duke Kominers, Harvard University, July 2010. (draft pdf) (appendix) (software, joint with William Weingarten) (slides)
Cournot points the way to an efficient solution of the holdout problem approximately preserving property rights. Active working papers"Pass-Through as an Economic Tool" with Michal Fabinger, Harvard University. First version: July 2008, Current version: October 2009.
The pass-through rate simplifies, unifies, generalizes and extends many areas of industrial organization models.
"The Price Theory of Two-Sided Markets," Harvard University. First version: December 2006, Current version: October 2009. (pdf)
Pass-through provides a simple analysis of horizontal and vertical mergers in two-sided markets, overturning conventional wisdom.
"Psychic Income, Taxes and the Allocation of Talent," Princeton University, December 2007. Revision in progress with Charlie Nathanson. (pdf) (request revision notes)
Low taxes encourage smart students to go into lucrative, socially unproductive professions, like law and finance.
"Double Marginalization in Two-Sided Markets," Harvard University and TSE, July 2008. (pdf)
Vertical mergers are still beneficial in two-sided markets.
"Slutsky meets Marschak: First-Order Identification of Multi-product Production," Harvard University, December 2009. (pdf) (appendix) (slides)
The econometric identification approach corresponding to Chetty's "sufficient statistics approach," solved for multi-product producers.
"Imperfect Platform Competition: A General Framework" with Alex White, Harvard University and TSE, May 2010. (request draft) (slides)
A novel solution concept, insulated equilibrium, eliminates much of the equilibrium multiplicity in platform competition, giving simple general framework for applied and theoretical analysis.
"Materialistic Genius and Market Power: Uncovering the Best Innovations" with Jean Tirole, Harvard University and TSE, August 2010. (pdf) (online appendix) (simulation code)
A multi-dimensional screening framework for trading off the sorting benefits of IP against its distorting effects on consumption ex-post. Older working papers"Biasing Auctions," Princeton University, April 2006. (pdf) (teaching slides)
Different explanations of equilibrium winner's curse have different implications for auction design and are testable.
"Overconfidence in Neural Networks," Princeton University, May 2006. (request a copy)
Overconfidence arises naturally in a classical neural network model.
"Universal Speculation," Princeton University, May 2006. (request a copy)
The "Universal Portfolios" algorithm of Cover (1991) conflicts would not be used by a Bayesian investor.
"A Simple Theory of Scientific Learning," Princeton University, September 2007. (pdf) (short summary) (presentation slides)
A model for testing theories with precise predictions against theories with vague predictions.
"Is Arbitrage Socially Beneficial?" Princeton University, October 2007. (pdf) (presentation slides)
Arbitrage and financial innovation are harmful when arbitrage opportunities are created by irrational investors. Work in progress with results"The First-Order Approach to Merger Analysis" with Sonia Jaffe. (extended abstract) (request notes) (technical slides) (policy slides)
We formalize, generalize, and clarify the sense in which the effect of a merger is approximated by the pass-through of cannibalized profits, the foundation of the draft US horizontal merger guidelines.
"Oligopoly Pass-Through" (request notes)
In highly but imperfectly competitive markets, the relative elasticity of residual supply and demand determines whether the pass-through rate is high or near zero.
"Pass-Through and the Theory of Monopoly" with Michal Fabinger. (request notes)
Breaks off the first section of "Pass-Through as an Economic Tool", simplifying proofs and generalizing them to allow general marginal costs and increasing marginal revenue.
"Pass-Through and Functional Forms" with Michal Fabigner. (request notes)
Breaks off the last two sections of "Pass-Through as an Economic Tool", showing additionally how Apt demand extends the CES class of demand specifications typically used in aggregate models.
"The Correspondence Principle and the Law of Demand" with Jon Ullman. (request notes)
Weak, intuitive stability conditions alone imply the law of demand (when applied locally) and strong uniqueness (when applied globally).
"A Practical Test for D-Stability" with Jon Ullman. (reques t notes)
A fast, simple algorithm for testing the D-Stability of large matrices.
"Multi-Sided Platforms with Heterogeneous Externalities" with Andre Veiga (request notes)
Extends my AER paper to allow for heterogeneous externalities.
"A Robust Pigouvian Mechanism for Collective Decisions" with Scott Duke Kominers. (request notes)
A mechanism approximating the expected externality mechanism for binary collective decisions. Popular/opinion pieces"Financial Guidance from FDA," Boston Globe, December 3rd, 2008. (published version)
"Put the Bankers Back to Work," Huffington Post, February 5th, 2008. (link) |
